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)
)
)
)
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)
)
~
)
)
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)
the Estate of BARBARA SUE
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______________ )
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the Appellant's Brief, Jim Hodge, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Paul
Robert Welch ("Welch Estate"), argued that Idaho Code section 15-2-803 ("Slayer Statute") did
not apply to the subject checking and savings accounts with Farmers Bank (the "Accounts")
because Paul Robert Welch ("Welch") had contributed all monies to the Accounts and Idaho
Code section 15-6-103 ("Joint Account Statute") provides that the contributor of monies to a
joint account is the owner of the monies. The Welch Estate further argned that the district court
erred by raising, sua sponte, two provisions of the Slayer Statute that were not raised by the
Estate of Barbara Sue Chitwood ("Chitwood Estate"), and also making a finding of fact-that
Welch was a "slayer"-that was not raised for decision in a motion for summary judgment.
In response, the Chitwood Estate argues principles of joint tenancy without ever
mentioning the Joint Account Statute. Additionally, the Chitwood Estate does not explain how
the district court can raise causes of action sua sponte and argues that the district court could
decide whether Welch was a "slayer" on summary judgment because that was an issue in the
case, even though it was not raised in a motion for summary judgment.
As a matter of clarification, the Chitwood Estate pointed out that the Welch Estate was
mistaken in regards to what subsections of the Slayer Statute were applied by the district court.
See Respondent's Brief, p. 13, n. 1. In Section C of its Appellant's Brief, the Welch Estate

incorrectly stated that the "trial court awarded the Account Funds to the Chitwood Estate based
upon subsections (c) and (g) of the Slayer Statute." Appellant's Brief, p. 13. As noted in the prior
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Section B, the trial court found that subsections (c) and (h) applied. Subsection (g) was the only
ground raised by the Chitwood Estate for obtaining the Account funds and the district court had
rejected that basis.
II.

ARGUMENT

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY MAKING A FINDING THAT WELCH WAS A
"SLAYER" ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN THAT ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED
FOR DECISION IN A MOTION.
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, the Welch Estate raised the issue of the legal
applicability of the Slayer Statute in its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Welch Estate did not
raise, nor argue, the factual dispute of whether Welch was or was not a "slayer." As the Court
reviews the Welch Estate's argument, it is clear that the issue of whether or not Welch can be
considered a "slayer" would be rendered moot should Welch's argument be correct.
The Chitwood Estate misstates the Welch Estate's position, stating, "Welch makes the
claim that in filing a motion for summary judgment, the 'Slayer Statute' was not properly before
the court." Respondent's Brief, p. 5. To be clear, it is the Welch Estate's position that a portion
of the Slayer Statute was properly before the trial court on a motion for summary judgment
because the Welch Estate was arguing that the Slayer Statute had no legal application. The
Welch Estate continues to contend that the factual issue of whether Welch is a "slayer" was not
before the trial court because no party raised that issue for determination in a motion for
summary judgment.
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Simply because an issue may ultimately be decided by a trial court does not mean that it
is properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment. The Chitwood Estate argues that
this factual issue was properly before the court because "[i]n its answer and both responses to the
motions for summary judgment, Chitwood repeatedly indicated that the court was required to
apply the 'Slayer Statute' and ultimately determine if it was applicable in a finding that Welch
was indeed the slayer of Chitwood." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. While evidence would certainly be
appropriate on this issue at a trial, where all issues in a case are tried, evidence of this factual
issue is only appropriate in a summary judgment proceeding if that factual issue is raised in a
motion for summary judgment for determination. As the Welch Estate was the only party
moving for summary judgment and did not raise that issue, it was not properly before the court
for determination at that time.
As noted by the Welch Estate in its Appellant's Brief, issues not raised in a motion for
summary judgment may not be decided by the trial court in its ruling on summary judgment.

Harwoodv. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,678, 39 P.3d 612,618 (2001). The policy behind such a rule
is simple and straightforward: the party against whom the finding of fact will be made "must be
given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate" why that finding of fact
should not be made. Id. (addressing the granting of summary judgment generally).
The principle that trial courts should not consider issues not raised in movant' s motion is
not new. In Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 528, 887 P.2d 1034, 1035
(1994), an insured sued its insurer in negligence for failure to raise insurance coverage pursuant
to the insured' s request. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no
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duty owed and that, if there was a duty, the insurer did not breach it. Id. Even though the district
found that there were issues of fact regarding the duty and breach, it nonetheless granted
summary judgment finding there was no issue of material fact regarding proximate causation. Id.
at 528-29, 887 P.2d at 1035-36. On appeal, and in a section entitled, "In ruling on the motion for
summary judgment, the district court should not have considered issues not raised in the
movant's briefing," the Supreme Court of Idaho agreed with the insured that the "district court
should not have granted summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation because the
[insurer] never raised this issue in their motion." Id. at 530, 887 P. 2d at 1037. The Court noted
that a party responding to a motion for summary judgment is only required to address "elements
challenged by the moving party's motion" and since the issue of proximate causation was not

raised, the insured "were not required to address this element of negligence even though they
will ultimately have to prove it at trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
The circumstances in this case are similar, albeit more prejudicial. The issue of whether
Welch was a "slayer" was not raised by the Welch Estate in its motion for summary judgment,
but nonetheless, the trial court made that factual determination against the Welch Estate, the
moving party. Despite the Chitwood Estate's argument that the issue of whether Welch was a

"slayer" was for the trial court to determine, as noted in Thomson, above, only those elements
challenged in a motion for summary judgment are appropriate for decision. As the element of
"slayer" status was not raised in a motion, it was not appropriate to decide that issue as part of
deciding that motion.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF I Page 4

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SUA SPONTE RAISING CAUSES OF ACTION
NOT RAISED BY THE CHITWOOD ESTATE.
Additionally, the trial court raised two causes of action not raised by the Chitwood Estate,
and then made its determination based upon those new causes of action. The Chitwood Estate
argues that the subsections relied upon by the district court were not causes of action and that the
trial court was obligated to raise those not raised by the Chitwood Estate. The Chitwood Estate is
incorrect.
To begin, causes of action are distinctively identifiable by their elements. 1 For example,
the cause of action "negligence" requires a showing of(l) a duty, (2) a breach, (3) causation, and
(4) actual loss or damage. Id. at 529, 887 P.2d at 1036. At times, similar causes of action have
overlapping elements, but not the exact same elements, such as the nine elements of fraud versus
the elements of constructive fraud which include seven of the nine elements of fraud (excluding
knowledge of falsity and intent to induce reliance) and an additional element (breach of duty
arises from a relationship of trust and confidence). Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147
Idaho 378,386,210 P.3d 63, 71 (2009).
It appears that for this reason, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a party asserting
statutory rights, where numerous bases may exist, must articulate which provision is being
pursued. In Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (2010), the Idaho
Supreme Court noted that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act only permitted recovery for

1

The Estate of Chitwood cites to Black's Law Dictionary to defme "cause ofaction." Respondent's Brief, p. 13. In
so doing, the Estate of Chitwood omits the relevant portion of the definition, which states, "[a] legal theory ofa
lawsuit." Cause ofAction, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2005).
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specific statutorily-enumerated acts and a claimant "failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted" under that Act by failing to specify the prohibited unfair or deceptive practice.
Similarly, each subsection of the Slayer Statute is a distinct cause of action. The Slayer
Statue has specific statutorily-enumerated bases giving certain rights for recovery. Each one of
those bases has its own elements to be proven, with some elements overlapping. Subsection (c)' s
elements include:
(1) the person is a "slayer" (which includes its own elements), and
(2)(a) property is to pass from decedent to slayer under statues of descent and
distribution; or
(b) property is acquired by slayer
(i) by statutory right as surviving spouse; or
(ii) under any agreement made with the decedent.
Subsection (h)'s elements include:
(1) the person is a "slayer" (which includes its own elements);
(2) the slayer holds a contingent remainder or future interest; and
(3) said contingent remainder or future interest becomes vested or increased upon the
death of the decedent.
These two subsections have some overlapping elements, but other elements are distinct.
Therefore, these two subsections are not the same cause of action, but two separate causes of
actions with their own elements, much like fraud and constructive fraud are two distinct causes
of action.
The Chitwood Estate cites to Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d
846 (Ct. App 1994) in support of its argument that "if the trial court correctly applied the 'Slayer
Statute', it should be affirmed" regardless of whether the Chitwood Estate asserted the specific

APPELLANT'S BRIEF I Page 6

Slayer Statute subsections that the trial court relied upon. Mason does not support that
contention.

In Mason, the trial court granted summary judgment to a moving defendant on a basis
that was not asserted by the defendant. Id. at 431, 871 P.2d at 848. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals agreed "that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on bases not asserted
in the defendants' motion." Id. However, the Court then recognized that if the district court's
order was correct on another theory properly raised, then the Court would affirm on that theory.

Id. at 432, 871 P.2d at 849. The Court specifically stated that it would "consider whether the
summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claims should be affirmed on the statute of limitations
grounds advanced by the defendants below." Id. (emphasis added).
In regards to the sua sponte raising of causes of action, this case is not like Mason. In

Mason, the issue was not whether the causes of action or defense was raised by a party in the
case, but whether a basis supporting a summary judgment order was raised in the motion for
summary judgment. In this case, the Chitwood Estate did not raise subsections (c) or (h) at all.
As the Mason Court looked back to address the "grounds advanced by the defendants below,"
this Court cannot do the same in regards to subsections (c) or (h) because those were never raised
as bases by the Chitwood Estate. Therefore, Mason does not apply to allow this Court to affirm
the trial court's imposition of and ruling on subsections (c) and (h).
Finally, the Chitwood Estate argues in passing that it "had referenced subsection (c) and
(g) as applicable." Respondent's Brief, p. 13. That assertion contains no citation to the record
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and the Welch Estate is unaware of where the Chitwood Estate raised subsection (c) at the trial
court level.

It is wholly improper for a trial court to interject new theories or causes of action into a
case, even more improper to do so on a motion for summary judgment, and even more so decide
the motion for summary judgment based upon the causes of action raised by the trial court.

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTIONS (C)
AND (H).
Even if it were permissible for the court to raise subsections (c) and (h) sua sponte, the
trial court erred by applying those subsections. Even the Chitwood Estate, in its attempt to justify
the trial court's decision, fails to identify what property interest or right in the Accounts "passed
to," was "acquired by," or otherwise "vested" in Welch as a result of Chitwood's death.
By and large, the greatest omission in the Chitwood Estate's brief is any mentioning of
the Joint Account Statute, which provides that a "joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit.. .. "
Despite that clear language identifying the parties' interests in the money, the Chitwood Estate
asserts general principles of joint tenancy-which do not apply here because Welch contributed
all monies in the Accounts2 and that finding has not been challenged on appeal.

See also R. 487 (district court holding that "presumptively, prior to Chitwood's death, the accounts belonged to
Welch even though it was designated with the bank as a joint account.").

2
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1. Subsection (c) does not apply.

The Chitwood Estate argues that subsection (c) of the Slayer Statute applies in this case.
In support, the Chitwood Estate engages in an analysis of joint tenancy and raises Sikora v.
Sikora, 499 P.2d 808 (Mont. 1972). Reliance on joint tenancy and Sikora is misplaced.

Subsection (c) provides that a "slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent
as to property which would have passed from the decedent or his estate to the slayer under the
statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by statutory right as surviving spouse
or under any agreement made with the decedent."
First, and although the Accounts were designated "joint," the principles of joint tenancy
are not applicable to the Accounts.

As mentioned above, Idaho Code section 15-6-103(a)

provides that a "joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in
proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on deposit.. .. " Therefore, principles on
tenancy are irrelevant as Idaho Code has already designated how ownership of joint accounts is
determined.
Nothing passed or would have passed pursuant to subsection (c). As the money was
owned by Welch, it could not have "passed" to Welch or been "acquired" by him as one carmot
"acquire" that which he already had.
Second, Sikora does not support the Chitwood Estate's claim to the Accounts. In Sikora,
a wife killed her husband and thereafter sought to be named the sole heir to his estate. 499 P .2d
at 809-10. On appeal, the "controlling issue" was whether the wife could "share in [husband's]
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estate by operation of the laws of joint tenancy, intestate succession, and dower." Id. at 810. The
Court in Sikora, as quoted by the Chitwood Estate, stated:
The question of whether Mrs. Sikora may by right of survivorship take property
owned jointly by her husband and herself has already been settled in Montana.
This Court held in the Estate of Cox .... that a joint tenant, who had intentionally
and wrongfully killed another joint tenant, was not entitled to the survivorship
share in the property.
Id. (emphasis added).
Sikora is inapplicable to the Accounts. As noted above, the money in the Accounts

belonged to Welch solely. Therefore, Welch was not taking anything by a survivorship share as
the money was already his. In fact, the Sikora Court limited the prohibition to the "survivorship
share" and not the entire property. Presumptively, under that qualification, the wife would have
retained her own interest in any jointly-owned property and been prohibited from acquiring
husband's interest in the property. That is precisely how the Slayer Statute is supposed to
operate.
In this case, however, the district court stripped Welch of his own money and gave it to
the Chitwood Estate. There were no interests of survivorship that were triggered here. Had
Chitwood owned any of the money in the Accounts pursuant to Idaho Code section 15-6-103(a)
and Welch tried to acquire that money via his right of survivorship and Welch was, in fact, a
"slayer," then Sikora, and the Slayer Statute would be applicable as to the amount that was
owned by Chitwood prior to her death. No such monies are at issue in this case.
Subsection (c) does not apply here. That statute refers to property "passed" and
"acquired" following the death of the decedent. No property was "passed" from Chitwood to
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Welch or "acquired" by Welch by way of Chitwood's death because, pursuant to Idaho law,
Welch owned all money in the Accounts and Chitwood owned none of the money.
2. Subsection (h) does not apply to the Account funds.

Similarly, subsection (h) does not apply in this circumstance. In defending the trial
court's decision, the Chitwood Estate misidentifies the appropriate parties to reach a conclusion
that subsection (h) applies. That subsection states:
As to any contingent remainder or executory or other future interest held by the
slayer, subject to become vested in him or increased in any way for him upon the
condition of the death of the decedent:
(I) If the interest would not have become vested or increased if he had
predeceased the decedent, he shall be deemed to have so predeceased the
decedent.
(2) In any case the interest shall not be vested or increased during period of the
life expectancy of the decedent.
Idaho Code section l 5-2-803(h). After quoting subsection (h), the Chitwood Estate cites to Idaho
Code section 55-105, which states, "[a] future interest is vested when there is a person in being
who would have a right, defeasible or indefeasible, to the immediate possession of the property
upon the ceasing of the immediate or precedent interest." Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Thereafter,
the Chitwood Estate argues:
The trial court found that Welch had a future interest in these accounts-his own
right of survivorship. If Chitwood survived Welch, her right of survivorship
would have become "vested." On that basis, the court correctly found that Welch
benefitted as a result of murdering Chitwood, which is not allowed under the
"Slayer Statute".

Id. The Chitwood Estate's argument suffers from at least two errors.
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First, Welch did not have a future interest in the money in the Accounts-he had a
present vested interest. He may have had a right of survivorship as to that which Chitwood
would have contributed, but since Chitwood did not contribute any of the funds, there was
nothing for Welch to have a right of survivorship in. In fact, Welch's interest in the Accounts
was that of the "immediate or precedent interest" recognized by Idaho Code section 55-105
because Welch contributed all funds to the Accounts.
Second, Chitwood's "right of survivorship" is irrelevant in an analysis of subsection (h).
Subsection (h) addresses the alleged slayer's future interest, not the decedent's. This makes sense
as the Slayer Statute is designed to prevent the slayer from acquiring property, not necessarily
how the decedent could acquire property.
In sum, subsection (h) does not apply because it addresses future interests of property
held by the slayer and Welch did not have a future interest in the Accounts because he had a
present interest-that of sole ownership--in all of the funds in the Accounts.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Slayer Statute does not operate to take property from the alleged slayer. The
Chitwood Estate argues that Welch should be prohibited from "benefitting" from Chitwood's
death. However, common sense indicates that Welch did not "benefit" because the money at
issue was already his. To interpret the Slayer Statute in such a way to strip Welch of his own
money would not only be an overly expansive use of the Slayer Statute, but go against the Slayer
Statute's express provisions that it is not to be a penalty.
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Therefore, the Welch Estate respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment of
the trial court and enter an order for judgment to be entered in favor of the Welch Estate.
DATED this 13th day of March, 2018.

./;!'

WOR.SSTT,, tF_/ITZ

STOVER, PLLC

J

By:/
Kirk:,<Melton
A meys for Appellant
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